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IN RE ROMANO

trial court and jury witnessed both films, which clearly demonstrated that petitioner had lied to his models and that he did
in fact photograph their private parts. The above related evidence considered in the light of petitioner's profession would
plainly support a conclusion by the jury that he produced and
possessed these films with intention to distribute and exhibit
them. It follows that petitioner has failed to' discharge his
burden on this collateral attack on the judgment of conviction,
and that the writ of habeas corpus which he seeks should be
denied.
McComb, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 9902.

In Bank.

July 7, 1966.]

In re CHAHLES ISADORO ROl\IANO on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Criminal Law-Punishment-Double Punishment.-Where the

objective of each burglary of which defendant was convicted
and sentenced was the commission of a grand theft, of which
he was also convicted and sentenced, the sentences for grand
theft, the punishment for which is less tp.an that for burglary,
must be set aside.
[2] Id.-Punishment-Double Punishment.-Though two burglaries were committed pursuant to a single conspiracy, defendant
may be punished for both burglaries where they were separate
crimes committed at.. different times and places and against
different victims.
[3] . Id.-Punishment-Double· Punishment: Conspiracy-Punlshment.-In a prosecution for conspiracy to commit two thefts
with charges of three overt acts (two burglaries and possession
of goods -stolen in the burglaries), defendant could not be
punished for both the burglaries and the conspiracy unless it.
had a broader objective than the burglaries and thefts; and
though evidence of other crimes was introduced, the jury could
not have found defendant guilty of conspiracy with an objective broader than that charged under an instruction that evi[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 1475; Am.Jur;2d, Criminal
Law, § 612.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 1475; [3, 4]
Criminal Law, § 1475; Conspiracy, § 27; [5] Conspiracy, § 26; [6]
Habeas Corpus, § 34(5) (e).
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dence of other crimes could not be considered to prove distinct
offenses or continual criminality, but only to show identity,
motive, intent, ability, knowledge, or common scheme.
[4a, 4b] Id. - Punishment-Double Punishment: ConspiracyPunishment.-Where defendant was convicted of and sentenced for- two thefts, conspiracy to commit the thefts, and
burglaries committed in furtherance of the consp~racy to
commit the thefts, he could not be punished for both the
burglaries and the conspiracy, which had no broader objective
than the burglaries and thefts charged, and the sentences for
theft and conspiring to commit theft were set aside, since the
punishment of not more than 10 years for conspiring to
commit grand theft is less than the punishment of one to 15
years for second degree burglary.
[5] Conspiracy-Verdict.-In a prosecution for thefts and conspiracy to commit thefts, though the jury was not instructed
to find whether defendant conspired to commit the felony of
grand theft or the misdemeanor of petty theft, it was clear
that the jury found defendant guilty of conspiring to commit
grand theft where he was convicted of the substantive crimes
of grand theft.
[6] Habeas Corpus-Grounds for Relief-Duration of SentenceNo Relief Prior to Expiration of Legal Term.-Defendant is
not entitled to release on petition for habeas corpus, though
his sentences constituting double punishment are set aside,
where he is held under other valid judgments of conviction.
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IN RE ROMANO,
[64 C.2d 826; 51 Cal.Rptr. 910, 415 P.2d 798]

PROCEEDING in habeas. corpus to secure release from
custody after judgments of conviction for burglary, grand
theft and conspiracy to commit grand theft. Sentences for
grand theft and conspiracy to commit grand theft set aside;
order to show cause dischargedand-writdenied.-- --- .
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Charles Isadoro Romano, in pro. per., and Russell E. Parsons, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.

Lnd

Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and Jack K. Weber, Deputy
Attorney General, for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner was convicted and sentenced
in Kern County on one count of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)
and one count of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487), the sentences
to rUn concurrently. He was also convicted and sentenced in
San Diego County on two counts of burglary, two counts of
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grand theft, and one count of conspiring to commit theft
(Pen. Code, § 182). The sentences for grand theft were to run
concurrently. The sentences for each count of burglary and the
one count of conspiracy were to run consecutively to each
other and concurrently with the sentences for grand theft. 1
Petitioner is also serving a term for a conviction of grand
theft in Los Angeles County which is not in question here.
In this habeas corpus proceeding petitioner contends that he
is being subjected to multiple punishment for a single act or
course of criminal conduct in violation of Penal Code section
654. [1] Since the objective of each burglary of which he
was convicted and sentenced was the commission of a grand
theft of which he was also convicted and sentenced, the Attorney General concedes that sentencing petitioner for both grand
theft and burglary in each case was improper. (People v.
McFa'rland, 58 Cal.2d 748 [26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449].)
Since the punishment for grand theft is less than the punishment for burglary, the sentences for grand theft must be set
aside. (People v. JlcFarland, supra, 58 Cal.2d 748, 762-763.)
[2] Petitioner also contends that section 654 precludes sentencing him for more than one crime committed in San Diego
County, on the ground that the two burglaries and the two
grand thefts were committed pursuant to a single conspiracy.
In In re Cruz, ante, p. 178 [49 Cal. Rptr. 289, 410 P.2d
825], we held that two otherwise separate crimes could each be
punished, even though they were both committed pursuant to
one conspiracy. We also held that a defendant cannot be
punished for both a substantive offense and a conspiracy to
commit it unless the conspiracy had an unlawful objective
in addition to the commission of the substantive -offense.--Under these rules petitioner may be punished for both burglaries, for they were separate crimes committed at different
times and places and against different victims.
[3, 4a] Three overt acts were charged in the San Diego
indictment, the two burglaries and possession of the goods
stolen in the burglaries. These acts were all committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy to commit the thefts, for whicll
petitioner cannot be punished in addition to being punished
for the burglaries. Accordingly, unless the conspiracy }lad Ii
broader objective than the commission of the burglaries and
lUnder Penal Code section 669, the sentences for the S~n Diego COUllt!
offenses run concurrently with the sentences for the Kern County off('ns~
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thefts, petitioner cannot be punished for the two burglaries
and also for the conspiracy.
The Attorney General contends that the conspiracy had a
wider scope than the alleged overt acts would indicate and had
a broader objective than the commission of the two burglaries
and related thefts of which petitioner was found guilty. He
contends that the purpose of proving overt acts is not -to show
the scope of the conspiracy, but merely to show that the criminal activity went beyond a corrupt agreement. (See People v.
Saugstad, 203 Cal.App.2d 536, 549-550 [21 Cal.Rptr. 740] ;
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 [77 S.Ct. 1064, 1
L.Ed.2d 1356].) In the present case, however, petitioner was
not charged with a conspiracy having a broader objective than
the commission of the substantive crimes charged. Although
evidence of other crimes was introduced, the trial court
instructed the jury that such evidence could be considered to
show identity, motive, intent, ability, knowledge, or a common
scheme only with respect to the crimes charged and that it
could not be used to prove "distinct offenses or continual
criminality." (See CALJIC No. 33.) Accordingly, under the
instructions given, the jury could not have found petitioner
guilty of a conspiracy having a broader objective than the one
charged.
The question remains whether the sentence on the conspiracy count or the sentence on one of the burglary counts should
be set aside. The punishment for conspiracy to commit a
felony is the same as the punishment for the felony itself.
(Pen. Code, § 182.) [5] Although the jury was not
instructed to find whether petitioner conspired to commit the
- -felony of grand theft or the misdemeanor of petty theft, it is
clear that it found him guilty of conspiring to commit grand
theft, for it convicted him of the substantive crimes of grand
theft.
[4b] The punishment for conspiring to commit grand theft
is imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 10 years
(Pen. Code, § 489), and the punishment for burglary in the
second degree is imprisonment in the state prison for not less
than one and not more than 15 years (Pen. Code, § 461). Since
the punishment for conspiring to commit grand theft is the
lesser, it must be set aside.
The sentence for grand theft in Kern County is set aside.
The sentences for grand theft and the sentence for conspiring
to commit theft in San Diego County are also set aside.
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[6] Petitioner is not entitled to release, however, since he is
held under other valid judgments of conviction. The order to
show cause is therefore discharged and the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus is denied.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Burke, J., and
"\Vhite, J.,:II= concurred.

[Crim. No. 9944.

In Bank.

July 7, 1966.]

In re MARGARET LOUISE :McCARTNEY
on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Criminal Law -

Former Jeopardy - Offenses of Different
Degrees-Conviction of Included Offense: Homicide-Defenses.
-Defendant's conviction of second degree murder at her first
trial "Was an acquittal of first degree murder, and her conviction of manslaughter at her second trial was an acquittal of
second degree murder.
[2] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Offenses of Different Degrees-Conviction of Included Offense: Homicide - Charging OffenseConviction of Included Offenses.-An indictment or information charging murder also charges all lesser offenses necessarily included in the crime of murder, including voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 1159); and one who
has been charged with murder, convicted of manslaughter, and
had his conviction reversed on appeal, may be retried for manslaughter on the original indictment or information.
[3] Homicide-Limitation of Prosecution.-Where an information
charging murder was filed before the three-year period had run
against manslaughter, following the reversal of defendant's
conviction of second degree murder in the first trial and the
reversal of her conviction for manslaughter in the second trial,
she could be tried under the original information for manslaughter though the three-year period had then run or she
could move to have the information amended to reflect that she
could be convicted of no higher offense than manslaughter.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 311; Am.Jur., Homicide (1st ed
§ 572).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 145; Homicide,
§ 28; [2] Criminal Law, § 145; Homicide, § 48; [3] Homicide,
§ 2.
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

